

TOP SECRET

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25X1 2/23/62 19

land it on the field which would have given them a plane that they really could have told what it was all about rather than piecing a lot of wreckage together. That factor right there is the most potent factor in my mind.

25X1 That was our opinion. That confronted us as soon as we got the assessment of what happened.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: I can't see why they would make a deal for a wrecked plane -- that he would deliver a wrecked plane when it was just as simple for him to deliver a plane in perfect condition.

MR. BROSS: From his point of view I would think he would prefer it.

25X1 There is his side too.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: If they were going to make a deal and pay him the money it is just as easy for him to deliver a plane in perfect condition.

GENERAL BULL: To carry it to the extreme when you realize that all of the evidence you have is Soviet origin -- even the communications -- it all came from the Soviet originated source -- all of it -- and there is no reason that I know why that couldn't have been provoked and he had landed at a field as far as that goes. That's a rather extreme view but if Powers were a defector and the stories were agreed upon you can't wipe that out completely. In some respects it seems rather absurd. They would have to fake their communications intelligence at the far end of it wouldn't they?

MR. HOUSTON: Well, you can argue this one.

GENERAL BULL: Yes, I know. On the question of defection I think we have to keep in mind all this information is coming from Soviet sources.

25X1**TOP SECRET**25X1

TOP SECRET

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2/23/62 /22 20

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: -- but from our point of view, looking at it in the raw, it is something you have to analyze.

MR. HOUSTON: Then you have the further consideration of how defectors are treated when they defect -- if you put them on trial and hold them, whereas the normal treatment to the defector is to give encouragement for more to come over. His treatment is not consistent with any known defector policy.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: No, except to throw a caveat in -- if what took place with Mrs. Powers -- she came back to the United States and she took the money -- as far as he was concerned he accepted the punishment on account of his assurance that she was taken care of. It's a rather involved improbable sort of reasoning, but from what we know about the relations between the two --

MR. BROSS: If the defection story is to have any plausability at all I think you have to believe that Powers at this moment is a very crafty Soviet agent who was prepared to go through this trial, go through all this business and come back here with some sort of a mission to continue espionage against the United States. Now I will hardly comment on the probability of this story in view of the impression which we have of him. This would make Cicero look like a three-year old child.

We weighed that very point against the value of the information withheld by Powers from the Soviets. If we follow your point then we must assume that he has not withheld information and he has

25X1

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

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2/23/62 21

told them everything and our estimate is that the value of the information that he seemingly has withheld --

MR. BROSS: How do you know he has withheld it? It didn't come out in the trial, but how do you know he didn't tell all these things to his interrogators?

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 Our estimate is that they would have used it to our disadvantage.

MR. BROSS: Maybe they used it to our disadvantage by concealing the fact that he did not. This is getting very speculative.

MR. HOUSTON: It would appear to have great propaganda value.

MR. BROSS: I am saying if you want to carry this to ultimate extremes --

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Let me ask this, and don't answer if you can't, but would counter intelligence have a staff, or whatever you call it -- people close enough in to the authorities in Russia that if Powers had told them a lot of stuff that didn't come out in the record you would have been advised?

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 That would be the ideal situation. To my knowledge, no.

MR. HOUSTON: Let's say that if it had been widely circulated in Soviet circles we might have picked up some rumors of it and probably would have.

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 We have received no indication from any source of the material information that Powers seemingly withheld from them. It is

25X1

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

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2/23/62 [REDACTED] 22

a little startling to us that in light of past experiences with Soviet interrogation methods that they did not pressure this man and they did not pressure the RB-47 fliers to the extent that we thought they would pressure them. I don't know what this signals, but apparently they have thrown away their thumb screws.

MR. HOUSTON: Are there any more questions on a defection?

Just briefly, [REDACTED] you also studied and considered the possibility of sabotage.

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[REDACTED] Well, we have been alert to reports of that and there have been a number of reports. I think the most recent was a statement by Jack Anderson in "Parade Magazine" Sunday paper here about a month ago as to the security of the Base and the improbability of sabotage -- no, that had to do with Base security.

MR. HOUSTON: We have had some testimony on that but you have nothing to lead your staff to thing that sabotage was a problem.

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[REDACTED] No.

MR. HOUSTON: I think the third area you did make what you call damage studies.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: You say sabotage.

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[REDACTED] The possibility of putting something on that plane.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Something secretly put on that plane to make it explode?

MR. HOUSTON: -- or things in the fuel.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: If that had taken place there would be evidence

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TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET

25X1 2/23/62 23

of an internal explosion.

MR. HOUSTON: Presumably so.

MR. BROSS: Not necessarily, because some types of explosives could be put on the tail assembly of the aircraft which would be timed to explode at a certain period of time after take-off and this would be an ideal way of accomplishing the results that actually happened.

25X1 May I make an observation? You will recall three aircraft were involved during the immediate days preceding. It would have been extremely difficult for anyone to know which aircraft would be used on the mission. If this was so it would have to have been done immediately prior to take-off and at that time there were many security guards in the area and they were guarding the plane very rigidly.

MR. HOUSTON: In assessing the damage resulting from Powers' capture and the information he gave, I'd like to deal with two points: One, do you feel that if he did give information not known to the Soviets which was of a highly sensitive nature -- not at all probably known to the Soviets.

25X1 No.

MR. HOUSTON: We know he probably gave some information such as a few names that they may not have known.

25X1 As a matter of hindsight, he feels he might have successfully withheld them. He had no way to judge that at the time. The fact that he was able to withhold the names of the pilots is an indication of the inefficiency of the Soviet interrogators.25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1

TOP SECRET

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25X1 2/23/62, 24

MR. HOUSTON: You think he was able to withhold certain sensitive information. Can you identify what you think he successfully withheld?

25X1 By playing down his own role and belittling his own knowledge he was able to avoid questioning in detail in the general areas of administrative procedures, installations and operations techniques and procedures. In our damage report we line these out as to one, two, three, and we have a long lists of what he might have been expected to know.

I will give a few examples here. We estimated that he would know the CIA/Air Force personnel procurement method for this Project. He played this one by saying that he left the Air Force. He resigned, or completed his tour, or what have you, and he was looking for a job and he was scouting around and was recruited by CIA for this Project.

MR. HOUSTON: This is what he told you since?

25X1 Yes. Now by doing so -- by selling them this bill on this point -- he avoided telling them what he actually knew about the arrangements between CIA and the Air Force for the acquisition of personnel for this Project. On the various methods, the Air Force units involved in the procurement methods and the personnel procedures for the Project, he didn't get into that at all.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: When you say he didn't get into it, you have no information about that except what he says.

25X1 That's right.

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

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2/23/62 25

GENERAL BULL: -- and the Russian trial.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: In this area of the things that he did not tell I come back to this same somewhat fantastic question. Let's say the matter of the altitude. He says he insisted the maximum altitude was 68,000 feet in order to keep from them that it was a capacity altitude of 72,000, maybe. Now if he lied all the way through to us, telling you and everybody that has talked to him and as a matter of fact he did tell them the maximum altitude, would that have been a subject that would have been talked about in Russian circles and rumored about and discussed -- the fact that this American plane they knew had this maximum altitude because he told them? Would that have been the kind of thing talked about enough in Russian circles for your people to have probably picked it up?

25X1

 Not from talk. I think that the Air people, and I don't want to testify for them, would have received indications of Soviet knowledge along these lines, yes.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: If that had happened -- if he were lying on that point you would have picked up some indication or some sign or something that the Russians knew that?

25X1 Well, our experience not only on this is that if they have information they give indications of using that information sooner or later in one way or another.

In regard to this matter of testifying to the altitude of 68,000 feet our inquiries into this matter disclosed that he was instructed

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TOP SECRET

25X1

TOP SECRET2/23/62 26

to underestimate this capability of the plane's altitude by I believe up to 5,000 feet, if possible. All through the trial 68,000 feet was mentioned. When we opened the debriefing of him the other day we said, "Why 68,000 feet?" His explanation to me was that if they had hit him or got him with a near miss from the ground they probably knew the capability of their fire and if he said 65,000 they would probably know that they could put that missile higher than 65,000. On the other hand, since they didn't confront him with 70,000 -- of course, they were confronting him with a figure in meters that approximated 68,000. "Okay, let it be 68,000. I am still underestimating the capability of the plane" and his explanations are so spontaneous.

JUDGE PRETTMAN: His instructions were to do it. We know that he says that is what he did, and the record of the trial shows up that so far as the Russians brought it out in public, that is what he did. His conduct on debriefing still supports the truth of what he says. All the stories from this Government, your outfit, intelligence, Air Force and so forth leads our people to think that he is telling the truth. Is that right? In other words, there is no false note that comes through somewhere or other that he is lying when he says he didn't tell them that.

 That is right.

JUDGE PRETTMAN: The whole thing checks out.

 Yes. The same thing applies to his apparent withholding of information on his other overflights -- the ones that he seemingly didn't talk about -- other participations in the Project, and his -- for example at the**TOP SECRET**

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TOP SECRET

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2/23/62 [REDACTED] 27

debriefing he was asked the question, "Were the Soviets interested in the participation of anyone else in the Project?" and he said, "Yes, but it came through to me through an interpreter and he interpreted that to my mind, were there other nationalities involved? Yes, we have a couple of Irishmen, Italians -- America is made up of all nationalities but we are all Americans and we all have the same passport. We are all down there together on this Project."

In going over these things with him and the readiness of his answers, if they are concocted he is an excellent actor.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: You brought me to the question I was going to ask. Were your people in on the debriefing team the last five or six days?

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[REDACTED] Yes.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Are other members of the debriefing team here?

MR. HOUSTON: [REDACTED] are part of the team.

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JUDGE PRETTYMAN: I will address this question to all of them.

25X1

[REDACTED] was there for four or five days.

25X1

[REDACTED] Yes.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: These people, including yourself, that participated in this debriefing are, I assume, experts in this business of questioning people.

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[REDACTED] We pose as such -- some of us on the technical side and some of us by experience in the field of interrogation.

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TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET

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25X1

2/23/62, 28

MR. HOUSTON: How many years have you been in the business, for example?

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I am a member of the bar in the State of
I have 25 years of service starting with the FBI in 1935.

25X1

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: I imagine we can assume not somebody just picked up and asked to do this but the debriefing team were experienced people in this matter of questioning people.

25X1

 Yes.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: In my profession we are engaged in this thing every day. It is a part of our regular routine. A fellow goes on the witness stand and he talks. An experienced prosecutor or an experienced judge has his own method but he comes up with the answer that the fellow is a liar. Do I make my premise clear to you? In other words, if I could pick four or five or six trial judges from the District Court bench here in Washington and if they had sat and listened to this fellow being questioned for four or five days, at the end the probability is each one could say, "He is telling the truth" or "He is a liar". That comes from experience. Now were there any notions on the part of any of your debriefing team that Powers was lying during these last four or five days while he said these things, or did you come up with a conclusion that what he told you is the truth.

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In answer to the first part of your question, there was no indication to us that he was lying. On the other hand, as an interrogator, I recognize the fallacy of accepting his bare word on this

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TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

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2/23/62, / 29

thing.

We had, during the course of the investigation of Francis Gary Powers and his movements and where he was and what he did - had come up with, let us say, more than one incident of, not behavior necessarily, but things that he did and was engaged in -- people he was with that it wouldn't necessarily be embarrassing to him to disclose, but, well, let me get a little more specific. The boys used to fly the T-33 up to Frankfurt for repairs. They would go over to Wiesbaden for R&R to a couple of night clubs. They had "B" girls, and one thing or another, and they would night club with these girls there and then on back to the base. Well, maybe their wives would like that and maybe they wouldn't if they knew they were up there drinking with the girls at that night club. We know that Powers frequented these night clubs so we took the opportunity to test him, not to confront him with the fact that he had frequented these night clubs, but from the standpoint of getting his assistance in connection with: Did he ever see any indication of Soviet activity at Adana or Frankfurt or Wiesbaden? What was the pattern of the movement of the pilots? What kind of R&R was engaged in? What were the R&R facilities? -- purely for the purpose of testing this man as to circumstances that under these circumstances might be a little embarrassing for him to talk about, to see how he would react. We knew already what he had done, where he had been, who he had been associated with at these places, and approaching him in this round about way, was he going to tell us about this? Our questions

25X1**TOP SECRET**25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1

25X1

2/23/62, 30

were of such a nature that we knew he would be thinking about the visit to these night clubs and we were sitting around talking about this thing from a counter intelligence point of view as to what were the Soviets doing. He said, "Sure I was visiting this place and this place and this place, and I was with so and so and so and so, and there was a gal up there I did some drinking with. I wouldn't want this generally known." He recounted to us A, B, C, what his activities were that we already knew. He left us with the impression, here's a man who will talk about anything you want to talk about and he will tell the truth.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: The sum total of your estimate of your cross examination of the fellow, and you did pursue methods of cross examination that would have revealed some hint that he wasn't telling the truth, but as a result of that your teams' conclusion is that he was telling the truth.

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 That he has told the complete truth.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Does that go for you other gentlemen on the debriefing team?

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 Yes, your Honor. I was admitted to the bar in

1949 and joined the FBI, and since 1952 I have been doing this type of

work. Beside me is who has participated in every major

debriefing and he has over 14 years debriefing experience.

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[indicating] has had more experience than the other members of the debriefing team, starting in 1938 and he has had over 30 years Government experience.

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TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

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2/23/62, [REDACTED] 31

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: In answer to my question, as you say, as a result of your debriefing and your cross examination and your efforts to test whether or not this guy was telling the truth --

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[REDACTED] I concur with [REDACTED] statement.

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JUDGE PRETTYMAN: And it was part of the debriefing team's objective not only to find out information from it but also to ascertain --

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[REDACTED] -- to assess the reliability of the subject, yes.

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MR. HOUSTON: [REDACTED] also.

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[REDACTED] Yes, that was the conclusion of the team. I was particularly impressed by one thing -- his willingness to tell little things that could have reflected to his disadvantage he made no attempt to cover up.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Were you satisfied he was telling the truth?

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[REDACTED] Yes, throughout. We found no flaws in going back over his story. He was consistent in every regard -- not one instance.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: One other thing I had in mind. [REDACTED] referred to the fact that near the time when the incident occurred -- when the incident occurred, up near Sverdlovsk there was a ground/air rocket base --

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MR. HOUSTON: Surface to air missile site.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: You just made a passing reference that it was a --

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[REDACTED] I was so informed by the technical people.

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: My question was, had he been told?

[REDACTED]

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TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

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25X1 2/23/62, [REDACTED] 32

MR. HOUSTON: Yes, the intelligence officer and the navigator would brief him. Also Powers was briefed that there was a SAM site by the people who --

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[REDACTED] We have photographs of that from previous missions.

MR. BROSS: The NSA officer who briefed us [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

MR. HOUSTON: We have definite testimony on this.

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[REDACTED] testified that he briefed Powers on this point.

JUDGE PRETTIMAN: Does anybody know what a near miss from a land/air missile would sound or feel like?

MR. HOUSTON: Not many people have been near one.

COL. GEARY: You would have to know what kind of a missile it was -- what kind of a warhead.

. . . . The meeting then went off the record

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[REDACTED] I would like to add a point that goes to the credibility of Powers. You may recall that the Soviets made quite a point of his - well, I'll

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call it alias -- [REDACTED] He used the name [REDACTED] while he was in training.

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There is an indication, and we know from other experiences that it makes good propaganda to come up with code names that have been used. This almost

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TOP SECRET

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2/23/62, [REDACTED] 33

indelibly establishes this as an intelligence operation if they come up with code names. It was rather significant to us that Powers' actual pseudonym assigned to him by the Agency was never disclosed, and I asked him that question on the tapes, if he did make any such disclosure. He said, "No, I did not." "Why didn't you disclose this?" He said, "I figured from publicity and the records that the fact that I was in training out West and used the name [REDACTED] that they could find that out rather easy, but" he said, "I knew that the pseudonym would only be on the Agency's record and they would have no way of finding that out, so I didn't tell them."

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Now, is that it?

MR. HOUSTON: I have no further questions and no further

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witnesses except [REDACTED] will be in later.

. . . . The Board recessed at 1205 hours

. . . . The Board reconvened at 1415 hours

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. . . . [REDACTED] was recalled as a witness and

reminded that he was still under oath by Mr. Houston

JUDGE PRETTYMAN: [REDACTED] we have called you back to

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describe your experience with one of these U-2's at the time you went over your maximum speed limit. You take over and develop what you want to.

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TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

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2/23/62 34

GENERAL BULL: We are interested in hearing your experience in a somewhat complex situation, as you suggested, exceeding the characteristics of speed with the U-2, in somewhat the same situation that Powers was in, just in the event that thing happened in the vicinity of Sverdlovsk. I understand there is some very tight limitations on the speed of the plane that is within the safety factor of the plane, both on the short and the long side -- slow and fast. Would you explain what your experience has been to the Board?

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Sir, during my training we were normally flying anywhere from four, five and sometimes six-hour missions. Later on these missions were extended into eight and nine-hour missions -- a maximum range at that time -- with simulated targets. A normal complement of flight lines, turns, and such all the time making notations. In other words, an actual simulated combat mission as we considered it. We normally at that time used an autopilot with a device called a mach sensor to maintain stability of the aircraft -- control of it -- and airspeed. That is the function of the mach sensor. At the time that I experienced the exceeding the design limits and the air speed of the aircraft, I was on automatic pilot and had the mach sensor engaged, and we were having some minor troubles with this piece of equipment but nothing to be alarmed about, of course. It made the mission much more successful if the equipment was working, although it was not necessary to complete the mission.

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I am certain that you realize after an eight hour mission

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TOP SECRET

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ground, ruling out wind. I had turned and the mach sensor disengaged automatically and I had my head in the cockpit checking instruments, and as I turned I just looked out the canopy on the left. Now this particular equipment is on the right forward side of the cockpit -- on the right console, as we call it. I had made the turn and I came back into the cockpit for

25X1

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

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2/23/62 36

some reason and something didn't feel right. I knew it immediately. The mach sensor had already disengaged and the aircraft had gone through the limiting mach by this time. Now I very gingerly, very lightly eased the aircraft back to its design limitations. This again applies where we certainly might expect the aircraft to break up and come apart. I estimated that I was approximately ten knots above - in other words, higher airspeed than the design limitations of the aircraft and I was very fortunate in being able to bring it back through its mach -- limiting mach. I again turned back on course and completed the mission. I was practically four and a half hours away from home base at this time and I finished the mission by flying the aircraft manually.

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 You say you estimated you were ten knots --

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Yes, I estimated because I was trying to maintain an attitude by looking outside and also come back to the attitude indicated instruments in the aircraft. Once I had recovered and brought the nose of the aircraft slightly up and was again checking airspeed I estimated that I was about ten knots. I was more interested in recovering the attitude of the aircraft than I was in knowing just how fast I had gone above design limitations.

Now, Mr. Powers, as I understand, was hand-flying the aircraft, as we call it. He had lost the function of his mach sensor and possibly his autopilot. This I do not know, but throughout hand-flying the

25X1**TOP SECRET**25X1

TOP SECRET

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2/23/62 37

aircraft and making notations on the card -- on the green card -- you are much more alert to the airspeed. It can be flown very nicely and the aircraft does fly nicely as long as you stay ahead of it. It is very much like driving your car. You anticipate a turn and you steer into it instead of driving to the corner and turning right immediately, and you stay ahead of your aircraft. It is very possible to finish a long mission this way. Granted, you will be fatigued at the end of it. As far as maintaining an airspeed at altitude -- a desired airspeed -- hand-flying the aircraft, there is no problem. You can do this. A lot of feel goes into this. It's very much like sailing a boat, I think, or riding a bicycle. After approximately 500 hours in the airplane I think you can tell a lot of times -- provided that you have a horizon -- very much how the airplane is acting and how close to the airspeed you are. Again, you are still checking that airspeed indicator. You come away from the air speed indicator and you are checking again, you come back and check again. It is a normal cross check of the instrument panel. You are still checking the airspeed indicator even on autopilot. You are monitoring the airplane and its function at all times because of the very nature of the aircraft and the small limitations at altitude -- that is, mach and stalling -- you have to be right at airspeed. Now there are approximately three knots on either side of the designed airspeed that you want.

MR. HOUSTON: Have you flown the U-2 with the J-75 engine at 70,000 feet cruising?

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

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2/23/62, so

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 Yes, sir.

MR. HOUSTON: What is the approximate mean airspeed?

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 The desired?

MR. HOUSTON: Yes.

25X1

 Sir, it has been almost two years since I have

flown the aircraft and I'd like to go back to the charts -- we used a
chart -- on that point.

MR. HOUSTON: Could you give an approximation?

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 I believe about 108 knots indicated airspeed.

MR. HOUSTON: Indicated?

25X1

 This decreases with every thousand feet of

altitude above approximately 56 to 60,000 feet.

MR. HOUSTON: Your ground speed, without wind would be --

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 Approximately 400 knots. We used two different

cruising machs at one time. One mach was slightly higher than the one that
we found that would give us the best cruise -- in other words, mile per
pound or gallon of fuel and so we reverted back to obtaining range. We
came back one or two knots, I believe.

MR. HOUSTON: That was an economy measure opposed to
design.

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 Yes.

MR. HOUSTON: I think you said 108.

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 Yes.

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TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

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2/23/62, /40

navigation you are still concentrating on the airspeed indicator.

You are navigating, yes, maintaining a stable platform for the cameras, but you are still coming back to the airspeed indicator. It is a normal cross-checking of the instruments and in the operation of the aircraft.

MR. HOUSTON: At the time when you went over the design speed maybe as much as ten knots, what was the sensation that you felt?

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 I felt the autopilot disengage, and being in a turn --

MR. HOUSTON: With a click, or --

25X1

 You feel it throughout the whole ship. There is a feeling in the aircraft itself that it is still under control if it is under the autopilot - if it is under autopilot control and the autopilot controls the surfaces of the aircraft by a matter of clutches. Sometimes these clutches will slip just a little bit and you can feel this as it slips and gives just a little bit to make way for a change in attitude. This is normal. You can feel it. I believe a man that flies a lot, once he gets in the aircraft, you can feel everything that that airplane does. You might call it flying by the seat of your pants. Even though you are not flying by the seat of your pants you still have the feel.

MR. HOUSTON: Is that particularly so of this plane because you had direct controls.

25X1

 Yes, we had direct control with all of the controls of the aircraft and it had a very fine sense of telegraphing feel.

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

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2/23/62 /41

I always, as a matter of course - now this is my own technique - I suppose possibly a lot of other people used it too - when the aircraft was on autopilot I still flew with one hand on the control column. I just rested it on the yoke. That way I could feel. If I were busy now I might not have my hand on the yoke. I might have it back on the throttle vernier, which is a knob that moves the throttle back and forth and makes very minute adjustments.

COL. GEARY: The incident that occurred to you, did this particular incident occur while you were in the turn?

25X1

 The incident happened to me while in the turn.
Now, as I understand, Mr. Powers was straight and level then. He would very definitely be in a fine position to maintain airspeed.

COL. GEARY: If you were flying manually and making a turn, is it likely that you would be making any notes at that particular time?

25X1

 No, sir.

COL. GEARY: You would be concentrating on flying the airplane.

25X1

 Yes, sir.

GENERAL BULL: Would you consider there should have been a minor concern on the part of the U-2 pilot after having completed the turn with the obligation to fly manually, since the autopilot was off, and at the same time record his flight data, which I assume would require him to divert his attention elsewhere, which I think you had been involved in the same thing on your turn. Would that introduce a serious element of

25X1**TOP SECRET**25X1

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TOP SECRET

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25X1

2/23/62, [REDACTED] 42

danger to the plane due to the fact that your other task would divert you from this constant observation of speed? Is it that delicate?

25X1

[REDACTED] Sir, I believe I can say that if one were making notations on a card and hand-flying the airplane in this manner, as you bring out, you might write down some figures on the card and come back to flying the aircraft, then, as it was squared away, maybe make two figures more until you finally completed the task at hand at that particular time. You never get away from this airplane, especially so hand-flying it.

GENERAL BULL: That is a compelling requirement on the pilot to keep his eye on the airspeed.

25X1

[REDACTED] Yes, that along with engine instruments, but I believe I was checking the airspeed three times to any of the other instruments.

25X1

[REDACTED] One question, [REDACTED] In your technique of flying, as you are approaching a target -- and Mr. Powers was in this case; he had made a turn; he was lining up on a target which was designated a priority target on his flight map -- would you, under any circumstances at that time, be making any notations on your map?

25X1

[REDACTED] No, I would have either made them previously or shoot down the drain this notation until either I could take care of it later, or I would have made it previously and concentrated on my priority target.

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JUDGE PRETTYMAN: Thank you, [REDACTED]

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TOP SECRET
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Next 4 Page(s) In Document Denied

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

25X1